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Abstract. One of the major contemporary challenges to Thomistic moral psychology is 
that it is incompatible with the most up-to-date psychological science. Here Thomistic 
psychology is in good company, targeted along with most virtue-ethical views by 
philosophical situationism, which uses replicated psychological studies to suggest that 
our behaviors are best explained by situational pressures rather than by stable traits (like 
virtues and vices). In this essay we explain how this body of psychological research 
poses a much deeper threat to Thomistic moral psychology in particular. For Thomistic 
moral psychology includes descriptive claims about causal connections between certain 
cognitive processes and behaviors, even independent of whether those processes 
emerge from habits like virtues. Psychological studies of correlations between these can 
provide evidence against those causal claims. We offer a new programmatic response to 
this deeper challenge: empirical studies are relevant only if they investigate behaviors 
under intentional descriptions, such that the correlations discovered are between 
cognition and what Aquinas calls human acts. Psychological research on aggression 
already emphasizes correlations between cognition and intentional behavior, or human 
acts, and so is positioned to shed light on how well Thomistic moral psychology fits with 
empirical data. Surprisingly, Aquinas’s views have quite a lot in common with a leading 
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model of aggression, the social information processing (SIP) model. We close by 
suggesting how we might examine claims of Thomistic moral psychology from an 




In the end of the 21st century, philosophers raised the possibility that our best 
psychological science provided evidence that deep-seated and traditional assumptions 
in moral philosophy were false. Famously, Gilbert Harman and John Doris argued for 
what is now known as Situationism: the view that human behavior is largely a function 
of the situational, external influences and not the product of “character,” or the 
traditional virtues and vices.1 Harman and Doris’s arguments for Situationism sparked a 
lively and ongoing debate in mainstream moral philosophy (indeed, this debate is now 
its own cottage industry). More importantly, it has prompted moral philosophers to 
revisit and take seriously the question of where empirical investigation ends and 
philosophical investigation begins, and whether, and to what extent, empirical work in 
psychology can provide evidence for or against moral philosophical claims.  
 
1 Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosphy meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental 
Attribution Error," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 315-331, John M. Doris, "Persons, 
Situations, and Virtue Ethics," Noûs 32 (1998): 504-530, John M. Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and 
Moral Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).   
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The psychological studies cited by Harman, Doris, and other philosophers are 
meant to provide reasons for skepticism about folk and traditional philosophical claims 
about virtue. Thomistic moral psychology features claims that fall squarely within this 
target-- for instance, that we can acquire virtues like temperance and courage with the 
proper training and practice, or that Christian martyrs’ behavior is explained by their 
courage. Thomistic moral psychology can also make use of standard philosophical 
defenses against Situationism, such as the argument that virtue is rare and the 
psychological data is consistent with this.  
In this essay, however, we want to suggest first, that there is a more general 
empirical challenge to Thomistic moral psychology completely apart from its claims 
regarding the traditional virtues and vices. Thomistic moral psychology includes theses 
about the existence of certain cognitive capacities and the causal connection between 
cognitive processes and human behavior. To the extent that psychological studies reveal 
a lack of correlation between these cognitions or cognitive capacities and behavior, they 
unsettle claims about their causal connection. (For if there is a causal connection then 
we should expect, at the very least, evidence of statistical correlation.)  
Secondly, we argue that the psychological studies most frequently cited in the 
philosophical literature do not attend to the relevant kind of human behavior to bear on 
Thomistic moral psychology. For the kind of behavior about which Thomistic moral 
psychology makes claims is exclusively intentional behavior-- what Aquinas calls human 
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actions, and elsewhere, the moral species of action.  We suggest that psychological 
research on aggression, by contrast, does attend to this kind of behavior. Moreover, 
within social information processing models, psychological research on aggression 
investigates the correlation between intentional behavior and the very kinds of cognitive 
processes countenanced in Thomistic moral psychology. Thus, this empirical work on 
aggression offers a fruitful way to investigate the empirical chops of Thomistic moral 
psychology.  
Our main argument about Thomistic moral psychology is straightforward. We can 
summarize it as follows:   
1. Social psychological studies purport to show that behavior is not largely a 
function of character traits posited by (inter alia) Thomistic moral 
psychology. 
2. According to Thomistic moral psychology, there are two kinds of human 
behavior— the natural and moral species. 
3. The moral species of human behavior, but not the natural, is intentional 
and subject to moral evaluation. 
4. Conclusions from social psychological studies rely on observation of 
subjects’ behaviors in the natural species category. 




6. Social Information Processing theory examines correlations between 
aggression-related behavior and many of the same cognitive processes 
and factors as Thomistic moral psychology.  
7. Psychological studies of elements of Social Information Processing theory 
support a correlation between these cognitive processes and aggression-
related behaviors. 
8. Thomistic moral psychology can be tested using psychological findings on 
aggression.  
II. Preliminaries 
Out of the gate we need to explain what we mean when we say “Thomistic moral 
psychology.” In Aquinas’s works, we find a rich and complex picture of the capacities 
and activities of the human psyche, or what he calls “powers,” “operations,” and “acts” of 
the will and the intellect. Aquinas does not designate some particular domain of our 
psychology as “moral,” as though the cognitive capacities and activities involved in 
morally evaluable action and character are distinct from the capacities and activities at 
play in other domains of human life. So what could we possibly mean by “Thomistic 
moral psychology”?2  
 
2 Daniel De Haan makes a similar move with respect to perception and moral perception. See 
Daniel De Haan, “Moral Perception and the Function of the Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas’s Doctrine of 




Aquinas does have an account of what qualifies a behavior, behavioral pattern, or 
mental disposition as morally relevant. Just because a human performs a movement or 
has a trait doesn’t mean it is susceptible to moral evaluation. Aquinas holds a 
teleological moral theory: being moral is a matter of pursuing and achieving the good. 
Like Aristotle (and unlike consequentialist teleologists) he holds that humans should 
pursue what is specifically good for humans-- the best thing achievable in action for our 
kind of creature. We can infer what the best thing achievable in action for humans is 
based on the best (or as Aristotle puts it, the most godlike) capacities we have. And 
Aquinas explains that these are the capacity to use our cognition to direct our desires or 
“appetite.” While other creatures follow their appetites either without any cognition (as 
in the case of plants) or with cognition that is determined by external stimuli (as in the 
case of other animals), humans can do this, but they also have the ability to freely shape 
their actions, and downstream, their habits, by letting their cognitions inform their 
appetites. These capacities get taken up in the psychological activity of what Aquinas 
calls the “rational appetite” and the activities of the rational appetite he calls “willings” 
(ST I.II.1.2). The human good consists in the proper use of our rational appetite, since 
this is the best good achievable to creatures of our kind (ST I.II.4.4). And virtues, or 
morally good character, are just those dispositions that make excellent the human will, 
practical reason, and the relevant appetites.  
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Philippa Foot claims that for Aquinas, moral virtues are excellences of the rational 
appetite—that is, the will.3 This constitutes a strong reading of Aquinas on the 
connection between virtues and the will. But at the very least—that is, even on a weak 
reading, Aquinas maintains that the behaviors we can evaluate morally are just those 
that involve the will. Behaviors like digesting, reflexive bodily movements, even irrational 
perception, and being moved by force, don’t register morally because they are not 
voluntary. They are neither a proper nor an improper use of our rational appetite or will; 
they do not display a use of the rational appetite at all! Such nonmoral behaviors are 
what Aquinas calls acts of humans (actus humani).  
The behavior that issues from the higher-order cognition integrating with 
appetites are intentional actions, what Aquinas calls the human act (actus humanus). 
Every use of the rational appetite, or will, is morally evaluable-- morally good or bad-- 
insofar as it is better or worse with respect to helping us achieve the human good.4  
Suppose, for example, Sergio trips on a busy sidewalk and bumps into a 
passerby. Sergio is a human. That his movement was a behavior of a human person isn’t 
sufficient for us to think of Sergio’s bumping into someone as morally good or bad. In 
fact, on Aquinas’s framework, behavior, behavioral patterns, and dispositions have to be 
 
3 Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1978). 
4 For an excellent and thorough treatment, see Joseph Pilsner, the Specification of Human Action 




in some way a product of the will in order to admit of moral characterizations like 
“good,” “generous,” “malicious,” and so on. So if Sergio’s motion completely bypasses 
his will, it simply is not the sort of behavior we can characterize appropriately using any 
moral concepts. It is an act of a human, but not, in Aquinas’s sense, a human act.  
Many of the cognitive capacities and activities involved in producing morally 
relevant action, or human acts, of course, figure in nonmoral cognition and behavior in 
Aquinas’s framework. For instance, my perceptual capacity is in play when I walk into the 
nursery and smell dirty diapers, completely involuntarily (in fact, I would rather not 
experience that smell!). I employ this same capacity when intentionally cooking a 
delicious meal for a friend who needs cheering up.  
Still, we can take a selective look at the cognitive powers and processes relevant 
to the production of human action to better understand how what goes on inside the 
head interacts with the environment to issue in what is morally relevant on a Thomistic 
framework. We propose, then, that Thomistic moral psychology be understood as the 
account of those cognitive capacities employed and cognitive activities that cause 
intentional human action. The label “moral psychology” in this context refers to a 
somewhat artificial category in that there are not distinctive moral cognitive abilities on 
Aquinas’s view, but rather configurations of extant cognitive abilities which, when 
engaged with the appetite, get caught up in the moral life.  
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With these preliminaries in mind, we can turn to the family of empirical 
objections to which Thomistic moral psychology is vulnerable because of its descriptive 
claims about our behavior and the cognition that produces it.  
III. The Situationist Challenge Studies 
Thomistic moral psychology aims to depict accurately the cognitive processes 
and activities that produce human action. Contemporary psychology of course does not 
have precisely the same aim, since it investigates associations and correlations rather 
than causation. Yet the philosophical claims about causation stand to be corrected if 
psychological investigation gives us evidence that there is little to no correlation 
between what the Thomist labels a cause and its behavioral effect. In this section we’ll 
review the most well-known challenge to broadly Aristotelian and Thomistic moral 
psychology-- the Situationist Challenge from social psychology. We describe a set of 
psychological studies that are supposed to support this challenge. This will tee us up for 
introducing the deeper and more serious threat to Thomistic moral psychology posed 
by the empirical studies we describe, a threat not defrayed by extant responses to the 
situationist challenge.  
A now well-known empirical objection to virtue ethical views like the Thomistic 
one is this: validated, replicated studies in psychology appear to show that people’s 
actions are better predicted by features of their situations, like whether the room smells 
like fresh-baked cookies, than by traditional virtues and vices. For instance, Hartshorne 
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and May tested dispositional honesty in children and found very little correlation 
between children’s honest behavior across various situations.5 Psychological studies by 
Vernon, Hunt, and Mischel further supported the idea that the situation better predicted 
honest behavior than any personality factors.6 Fleeson explains, “so-called honest 
people frequently could (and did) act dishonestly, and so-called dishonest people could 
(and did) act honestly.”7  
Another study published by Darley and Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho,” 
made a splash in moral philosophy almost three decades later, when John Doris, Gilbert 
Harman, and Maria Merritt integrated it into their arguments against Aristotelian virtue 
ethics.8 The experiment first took a personality survey of Princeton seminarians, then 
assigned them the task of giving a talk on the Biblical story of the Good Samaritan in a 
nearby building. To get to the building, the participants would need to pass through an 
 
5 Mark A. May, Hugh Hartshorne, and Ruth E. Welty, "Personality and Character Tests," 
Psychological Bulletin 25 (1928): 422. 
6 Philip E. Vernon, "Personality Assessment: A Critical Survey," British Journal of Educational 
Studies 13 (1964): 113. J. M. Hunt, “Traditional personality theory in the light of recent evidence,” 
American Scientist 53 (1965): 80–96. Walter Mischel, Personality and Assessment (New York: Wiley, 1968). 
7 William Fleeson, Michael Furr, Eranda Jayawickreme, Erik G. Helzer, Anselma G. Hartley, and 
Peter Meindl, "Personality Science and the Foundations of Character" in Character: New Directions from 
Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology, ed. Christian B. Miller, Michael Furr, Angela Knobel, and William 
Fleeson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 41–71. 
8 John M. Darley and Daniel C. Batson, " 'From Jerusalem to Jericho:' A Study of Situational and 
Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27 (1973): 100-
108.  John M. Doris, "Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics," Noûs 32 (1998): 504-530. Gilbert Harman, 
"Moral Philosophy meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error," 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 315-331. Maria Merritt, "Virtue Ethics and Situationist 
Personality Psychology," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (2000): 365-383. 
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alleyway. But participants encountered in the alley a person “sitting slumped in a 
doorway, eyes closed, not moving. As the subject went by, the victim coughed twice and 
groaned, keeping his head down.9 Some participants were told they needed to hurry 
because they were already late. Of these only 10% stopped to help, whereas 63% in the 
“low hurry” situation stopped to help. Further, only one personality factor correlated at 
all to helping: those who scored high on “religion as a quest” were likely to offer more 
tentative help than those who scored low. The study has been used to illustrate that 
helping or compassionate behavior is more a product of situational features like 
whether one is in a hurry than about personality traits or even religious beliefs 
accounted for on the pretest surveys.  
A set of experiments known as the moral hypocrisy studies were conducted by 
Daniel Batson and claimed to show the prevalence of “moral hypocrisy,” defined as 
“motivation to appear moral yet still benefit oneself.” This and other studies by Batson 
have proven extremely influential in philosophy, whatever their influence in psychology 
may have been.10 In a 1997 article, “In a Very Different Voice: Unmasking Moral 
 
9 John M. Darley and Daniel C. Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho.” 
10 Daniel C. Batson, Diane Kobrynowicz, Jessica L. Dinnerstein, Hannah C. Kampf, and Angela D. 
Wilson, "In a Very Different Voice: Unmasking Moral Hypocrisy," Journal of Personality and Social 
Pscyhology 72 (1997): 1335-48. In fact, Batson, along with Walter Mischel and Stanley Millgram, is one of 
the most cited psychologists in moral philosophy, and in the virtue ethical and theoretic literature in 
particular. This is perhaps due to the moral hypocrisy studies being used as a primary example in the 
initial Situationist challenge by John Doris and Gilbert Harman, and then by authors of prominent 
responses to Doris and Harman, such as Gopal Sreenivasan, “Errors About Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait 
Attribution,” Mind 111 (2002), 603-612; Rachana Kamtekar, "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content 
of our Character," Ethics 114 (2004): 458-481; Christian B. Miller, Moral Character: An Empirical Theory, 
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Hypocrisy,” Batson et al. claimed their experiments unsettled the assumption that 
people act on the basis of their moral beliefs or moral reasoning.11 Subsequently 
philosophers and psychologists utilized the findings of these studies to criticize 
Aristotelian and Thomistic ideas about honesty as a reasonably attainable virtue on the 
basis of which many people act.12  
There were several different experimental designs, but all had the following in 
common. First, all the participants took a questionnaire in which they rated on a Likert 
scale how well various perspectives fit their thinking when, for instance, “trying to decide 
what you should do in a social conflict situation.” An example of a social conflict 
situation used was a friend who rarely attends class asking to borrow notes. They were 
then told that the subsequent parts of the study had been canceled, but they could 
instead participate in a separate study at the appointment time originally scheduled for 
 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), and Christian B. Miller, Character and Moral Psychology, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). Batson and many philosophers using his work assume that giving the 
reward away is morally good, keeping it is morally bad. That is, they equate altruistic behavior with moral 
behavior, and benefit to oneself with egoism. Neo-Aristotelians like Talbot Brewer and Julia Annas have 
challenged this assumption, rejecting the modern view of individual good as in opposition to the good of 
others on which it is predicated. See Talbot Brewer, The Retrieval of Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), and Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For more recent 
discussion of the coin-flip moral hypocrisy studies in philosophy, see Christian Miller, Moral Character;  
Christian Miller, Character and Moral Psychology; Christian Miller, "Virtue Cultivation in Light of 
Situationism," in Developing the Virtues: Integrating Perspectives, eds. Julia Annas, Nancy Snow, and 
Darcia Narvaez  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 157-183, and Matt Stichter, The Skillfulness of 
Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).  
11 Daniel C. Batson et al., "In a Very Different Voice.”  
12 See Christian Miller, Honesty: The Philosophy and Psychology of a Neglected Virtue (Oxford: 




this study. In the second appointment, participants were told they were one of two 
participants in a study, and that they have the option of assigning one of two kinds of 
tasks to themselves and the other participant, who will be told their task has been 
assigned at random. In one kind of task, the positive task consequences, participants 
answer questions and get a gift certificate to a store of their choice if they answer 
correctly; in the other, the neutral task consequence, participants answer questions and 
there are no rewards or punishments for answering correctly or incorrectly. The 
participant would assign one of each type of task to themselves and to the second 
participant.13 The participants then rated their feelings during the task and after the task, 
such as “proud” and “guilty.”  
In the first experimental setup, the participants were all given the choice of 
assignment and then took a questionnaire asking what they thought was the “most 
morally right way to assign the task consequences” and whether they thought the way 
they made the task assignment was morally right.14 Batson et al. noted 16 of the 20 
participants assigned themselves the positive consequence and that only 1 of 16 who 
assigned themselves the task with the positive consequence said that assigning oneself 
that task was most morally right. They write, “the results were clear… moral motivation 
seemed rather weak.”15 In the same paragraph they admit, “We cannot say, however, 
 
13 Daniel C. Batson et al., "In a Very Different Voice,” 1339.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 1341. 
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whether obtaining self-benefits was the motive behind their action or simply an 
unintended consequence.”16 The researchers, as well as philosophers who have 
subsequently discussed this study, assume that assigning the positive consequence to 
others is altruistic and thus more moral than assigning the positive consequence to 
oneself. We’ll return to this in a later section.  
The second experimental setup looked at what happened when participants were 
given explicit moral cues, namely, telling participants that “most people think the most 
fair way to assign the tasks is to give both participants an equal chance of being 
assigned the positive consequences task by, for example, flipping a coin” and then 
providing a coin. 10 flipped a coin, 10 did not. Here the researchers were interested in 
correlations between participants’ earlier reported perspectives on social conflict 
situations and their choice to flip; the “moral responsibility” perspective and a focus on 
relationship-care most predicted the choice to flip. A “justice perspective” and ascribing 
responsibility to others did not reliably predict the choice to flip. Participants were again 
asked what they perceived was the most morally right way to assign the tasks. Of the 10 
who flipped the coin, 9 still assigned themselves the positive consequences task. Of the 
10 who did not flip the coin to assign, 9 assigned themselves the positive consequences 





researchers concluded that “this pattern indicated the presence of moral hypocrisy.”17 
Further, an iteration of the study in which experimental arm participants saw themselves 
in a mirror as they assigned the task, and control arm participants did not, showed a 
positive correlation between the presence of the mirror and assigning the positive 
consequences task to the other. This indicated to Batson and his team that the 
situational influence of the mirror played a more serious role in determining behavior 
than did a moral character trait.  
Batson and his team took the moral action to be either (a) flipping the coin and 
following the results to assign the tasks or (b) assigning the positive consequences task 
to the other person. They supported this understanding of moral action using the high 
frequency of participants reporting that these were the most morally right ways to 
assign the tasks. They concluded that most people are motivated to pursue self-interest 
while appearing moral. Further, they argued that their experiments provided evidence 
that the goal of being moral, or upholding a moral principle, could not be an ultimate 
motivation but merely an instrumental goal for the ultimate purpose of benefiting 
oneself.18 
Philosophers such as Doris and Harman use the coin flipping studies, as well as 
the Milgram authority experiments and Hartshorne and May honesty studies, to make 
 
17 Ibid., 1342. 
18  Ibid., 1347. 
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the case for a negative claim: the traditional virtues and vices are not in fact widespread. 
Building on this and the studies that appear to show correlation between situational 
influence and behavior (such as the mirror iteration of the moral hypocrisy studies), they 
further argued for the Situationism: human behavior is largely a product of situational 
influence, not largely a product of personality or character traits. The combination of 
arguments for the negative claim and Situationism became known as “the Situationist 
Challenge.” 
Defenders of the traditional virtues have offered compelling rejoinders to the 
Situationist Challenge of which the Thomist can avail herself. For instance, she might 
accept the negative claim, even the Situationist claim, but argue for the Rarity Thesis: 
virtues are rare-- so rare that we cannot expect that most peoples’ actions can be 
predicted by the presence of virtues. 19 This even accommodates the data that might 
lead someone to adopt the Situationist claim, by arguing that most people do not have 
the character traits, virtues, that would predict stable or reliable behavior.  
IV. The Minimal Empirical Adequacy Challenge for Thomistic Moral Psychology 
Even if the Thomist can dodge the situationist bullet using the Rarity Thesis or 
another strategy furnished by virtue ethicists, the theory remains vulnerable to deeper 
and more pervasive empirical threats regarding its claims independent of those about 
the virtues and vices. Thomistic moral psychology rests on descriptive claims about how 
 
19 Rachana Kamtekar, "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of our Character."  
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human behaviors are produced in the first place, whether those behaviors end up being 
reliable or predictable in such a way as to evidence traits. Are the kinds of replicated, 
validated psychological studies we just described compatible with or plausibly 
supportive of such claims? We’ll call this the Minimal Empirical Adequacy Challenge. 
Thomists should be worried not only with respect to jeopardizing descriptive claims in 
Thomistic theory of cognition but also with respect to the normative views about virtue 
and virtuous action that presuppose certain of these descriptive claims. There is a 
myriad of ways that scientific evidence might impinge on aspects of Thomistic 
psychology, but for present purposes, we will highlight just a few claims that render 
Thomistic moral psychology particularly vulnerable to empirical challenge.  
First, recall Aquinas’s claim that humans differ from the other animals on the 
basis of our capacity to be the source of our own behavior-- a human “moves itself 
toward the end” (ST I-II 1.2). We supposedly do this by freely fixing our attention on and 
then intending an end instead of being presented with an end either by some external 
stimulus, as in the case of plants, or by some cognition over which we have no control, 
as in the case of what Aquinas calls “brute animals” (ibid). This is a descriptive claim 
about what distinguishes us psychologically from other living things: 
Human Differentia Claim: Humans have rational appetite, which consists 
partly in the cognitive ability to direct one’s attention to an end for which 
one acts.  
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This descriptive claim features centrally in the normative account of the human 
good. Remember that any creature’s good is the best thing achievable for its kind, and 
we identify the best thing achievable for our kind as the proper activity of the highest 
capacity we have. Thus our identification of rational appetite, or will, as a capacity we 
actually have is critical to our identification of the human good as the proper activity of 
the rational appetite.  
The Human Differentia Claim has the potential to be unsettled by studies in 
cognitive science, psychology, or neuroscience. For instance, if studies on cognition 
provided strong evidence that our attention is a strict function of external stimuli, this 
would cast doubt on the idea that we have the ability to direct our attention freely. We 
might conclude instead that we are more cognitively like the other animals than 
Thomistic moral psychology suggests.  
Second, Thomistic moral psychology is committed to the view that some non-
negligible subset of human behaviors are human actions-- actions generated by the 
rational appetite. These actions turn out to be morally evaluable while other behaviors 
are not even if no humans actually perform morally good or morally bad actions 
routinely enough to form the habits of mind we call virtues and vices. The connection 
between certain elements of cognition and human action include what Aquinas calls the 
“apprehension of the end” – that is, a human being must cognize her end as a goal for 
her in order for her subsequent behavior to count as goal-directed or intentional.  
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End Apprehension Claim: Human action is preceded by cognition of an 
end conceived of as a goal of the action. 
When other animals act in goal-directed ways without cognizing their end as a 
goal, or when humans do this, the behavior resulting is not a product of the rational 
appetite, and thus not morally evaluable. 
Empirical study of cognition prior to action could prove inconsistent with the End 
Apprehension Claim in a way that would be problematic for Thomistic moral 
psychology. If studies were to measure people’s explicit goals-- that is, the ends they 
conceive of as such-- and their behavior and find no correlation between these, that 
would be bad news for the End Apprehension Claim.20   
Third, Aquinas’s depiction of the cognition preceding human action includes 
what he technically designates “intention” (intentio). Intention in this context means the 
choosing of a means for achieving an end. 
Intention Claim: Human action involves a cognitive choice of the means for 
achieving the selected end or goal.  
On the Thomistic view, the human who engages her rational appetite or will in 
acting does so “not without the intention of the end” (ST I.II 1.2). Without the intention, 
 
20 We have limited ourselves here to the swath of psychological studies philosophers draw on in 
the situationism debate. But recent work on psychology and free will would also bear on the End 
Apprehension Claim. Thanks to Brandon Dahm for pointing this out to us.  
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the person cannot be willed to actually bring about the end through her behavior even 
if she has cognized an end as a goal (ST I.II 12.1).  
Again, this claim is subject to empirical scrutiny. We might gain evidence against 
the Intention Claim via studies showing that we do not conceptualize the means of 
bringing about actions, given that we are completely inarticulate about the means even 
when we can articulate the goal for which we act. Or psychological studies might show 
that a person’s selection of an option for bringing about her goal does not correlate to 
her behavior. In that case we would have reason to doubt that her selection of the 
option, her choice or intention, plays a causal role in her behavior.  
The general lesson to be learned is this. Even if the Situationist Challenge can be 
avoided, Thomistic moral psychology faces a broader empirical challenge in virtue of its 
positing certain cognitive capacities and activities as causes of observable behavior: 
Minimal Empirical Adequacy Challenge: a philosophical moral psychology 
featuring claims about the cognitive causes of moral behavior (good or 
bad) must be shown to be consistent with psychological findings 
regarding associations between cognitive processes and behaviors or 
patterns of action.21  
 
21 This challenge parallels Owen Flanagan’s Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism, but does 
not pronounce constraints on a moral theory’s ideals. See Owen Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality: 
Ethics and Psychological Realism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 32. Our principle here 
simply states that a philosophical psychology’s claims about the behavior that gets assessed by those 
ideals (or other regulative statements) must be up to snuff, empirically.    
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Put simply, Thomistic moral psychology doesn’t only posit certain habits of mind, 
the traditional virtues and vices, as explanatory of behaviors, such that they should be 
able to predict behavior across situations and time. The account also asserts the 
existence of cognitive capacities and processes that produce one-off behaviors and 
more narrow behavioral patterns. To the extent that psychology and cognitive science 
can identify correlations and an absence of correlations between discrete aspects of 
cognition and these behaviors, they can offer strong empirical evidence for or against 
certain of these Thomistic moral psychological claims.  
The descriptive aspects of Thomistic moral psychology are not the only aspects 
susceptible to criticism based on psychological and cognitive scientific data. This 
account of our moral psychology makes normative claims, too, based on the given 
picture of our psyche. It presents certain habits or cognitive traits as ideals-- the 
acquired virtues-- on the assumption that these are attainable in the course of human 
life on earth. It claims that certain act types are morally good and others morally bad 
given their being characteristic outputs of virtues or vices, respectively.  
Both virtues and virtuous actions are moral ideals meant to be realistically 
attainable, not purely regulative ideals. This is because of the Thomist’s commitment to 
species-relative goodness (e.g. that what it is best for us to be like and do is to perfect 
and exercise capacities distinctive of our kind of creature). Whatever cognitive scientists 
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and psychologists find about what we are capable of has direct bearing on the way we 
conceptualize which traits and act types are good for human beings.  
Moreover, the normative claims of Thomistic moral psychology must conform to 
what Owen Flanagan calls the Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism: “When 
constructing a ...moral ideal, make sure the character, decision processing, and behavior 
prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures like us.”22 
Psychological studies might provide evidence that we are unable to develop certain 
good habits or avoid falling into bad ones. And this threatens to betray that the virtues 
posited by Thomistic moral psychology are not sufficiently human to be traits we should 
aspire to attain. Conversely, psychological studies might provide no evidence at all that 
suggests we have the ability to engage in certain cognitive processes that produce the 
kind of human actions for which we bear moral responsibility.  
Thomistic moral psychology in the modern era, then, bears a certain burden of 
proof. The defender of this picture of our moral psychology and action needs to be able 
to show at least that it is compatible, as a causal theory, with what contemporary 
psychology finds, as a theory of association and correlation. And certainly, we would do 
even better to show it positively compatible with empirical evidence about how what 
 




goes on in the head might look like and how it is associated with certain patterns of 
behavior.  
V. Does Psychology Study Human Action? 
Our main argument attempts to show that assessing intentional behavior, such as 
aggression, and exploring patterns of behavior over time, may be a more appropriate 
method than contrived psychological experiments, to examine major claims of Thomistic 
moral psychology outside of experimental conditions, such as of aggression.  To do so, 
we need to illustrate first where some psychological experiments operate on an 
understanding of human behavior orthogonal to the Thomistic understanding such that 
its data does not bear on claims the Thomist makes about human action. We also need 
to explain why research on behavior pattern development and changes over time, such 
as that of aggression, does bear on such tenets as the Human Differentia Claim, End-
Apprehension Claim, and Intention Claim. We undertake this joint task in the present 
section. We will argue that within aggression research there is a robust tradition of 
thinking of human behavior more akin to Thomistic “human action” than the more 
capacious category of behavior that includes acts of humans.  
Consider the (in)famous Darley and Batson Princeton Seminarian study discussed 
above. Helping behavior was coded into one of the following categories: 
“0=failed to notice victim as in need 
1=perceived need but did not offer aid 
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2=did not stop but helped indirectly (told the aide on their arrival) 
3=stopped and asked if victim needed help 
4=after stopping, insisted on taking victim inside and then left him. 
5=refused to leave victim, or insisted on taking him somewhere.”23  
The psychologists found no significant correlation between either religious 
personality traits or beliefs. Noticeably absent from the behavior codes are the goals 
and intentions of the participants. Additionally, the participants’ perspective on their 
situation-- what they noticed in their situation-- is not considered. In codes 0 and 1, the 
researcher observing infers what the subject is attending to regarding the victim being 
in need.  
The correlation studied here is between these observed behaviors and cognitive 
elements such as religious character traits and beliefs about a certain task-- delivering a 
short presentation. What is not studied is a correlation between what, on the Thomistic 
picture, is properly called human action, the action that is morally evaluable because it is 
a product of the will. We don’t know whether some participants saw the victims’ need as 
an opportunity to help, or as similar to the Samaritan’s, whereas others did not. We 
don’t know if some participants asked the victims if they needed help for the sake of 
alleviating guilt whereas others did so with the explicit goal of helping them in mind. We 
 
23 John M. Darley and Daniel C. Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho,” 100. 
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can hardly infer any of this from the observational descriptions of the participants’ 
behavior.  
On the Thomistic view, there are two levels of description of behavior, and only 
one level aligns with the morally evaluable kind of action-- human action. The first kind 
of description is the “natural kind” (species naturalis). This is the description a third-party 
observer would give without assuming anything about what’s in the agent’s head-- her 
beliefs, intentions, or desires. The other kind of description is the “moral kind” (species 
moralis).24  
The moral description is the description fixed largely by what is in the agent’s 
head.25 Here we need to be careful to follow Aquinas in circumscribing which mental 
activities can determine the moral description of an action. Some mental processes can 
lead to behaviors without the person’s agency being sufficiently involved to give us a 
proper moral description of her action. We often act on the basis of what Aquinas terms 
the sensible appetite—desires (passions) whose object is presented by our sense 
perception or imagination. Routine actions put this sort of action on display. For 
example, Julia might be so accustomed to driving herself to the parking lot of her office 
in the morning that she ends up there on a day she is scheduled to go to the doctor. 
 
24 David Gallagher, "Aquinas on Moral Action: Interior and Exterior Acts," Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association 64 (1990): 118-129. 
25 Here it’s important to not be misled by the semantic change in the term “moral” between 
Aquinas’s time and now; Aquinas simply means, by this, the kind of action specific to humans as creatures 
that can reason and act voluntarily. 
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Her actions are not mindless physical reflexes, but neither are they responsive to 
cognitions Aquinas calls particular reason, which would have directed her in the 
opposite direction. Her actions are instead informed by input from her senses—e.g. 
seeing the sign for 3rd street where she’s accustomed to turn left—and this sensory input 
directs her just like sensory input directs other animals.26  
In contrast to mental processes that give rise to routine actions, another set of 
cognitive processes generate full-blooded intentional action, and these processes help 
us identify the moral description of the action. Aquinas maintains that our desires or 
passions can be responsive to our reason and, as a result, when we act on such desires 
we are acting by choice. Reason supplies what Daniel De Haan calls an aspectual 
description to what is sensed or imagined—like the visual of the lefthand turn lane to 3rd 
street being seen as to be avoided, or to be pursued. “Whenever the operations of the 
sensitive powers are informed and integrated into the acts of reason and will, there 
occurs not just an act of seeing, but a voluntary act of seeing.”27 It is this voluntariness 
that renders the subsequent action intentional and so morally evaluable.  
To get a sense for the difference between a moral and natural description of 
human behavior, consider an example. Suppose I see my neighbor in his front yard grab 
 
26 Julia Annas, "Virtue, Character, and Disposition," in Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011).  
 
27 Daniel De Haan, “Moral Perception and the Function of the Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas’s 
Doctrine of Antecedent and Consequent Passions,” 304. 
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his kid and throw him to the ground. The kid yelps. The natural description of his act is 
something like “tackling someone.” But what is he up to? Stating the correct description 
of his intentional act requires that I know what he is up to; is he punishing the child? 
Asserting his dominance? Play wrestling? Running football drills? I might make some 
inferences about the moral description of his action— the intentional action— based on 
what I know about my neighbor and his child. If I know the child plays on a football 
team or is a wrestler, and that my neighbor has typically behaved very kindly to his 
children, I might infer that they are playing a game, and if an injury occurred it was an 
accident. That is, I’m unlikely to infer in such a case that what my neighbor was doing 
was injuring his child, on the intentional description, even if an injury results from what 
he is doing. If his action really is "playing football with his child,” that must be because 
playing is the end he has in mind as his goal and tackling the child is what he intends or 
chooses as part of satisfying that end.  
It is fair to say that the psychological studies typically used to challenge Thomistic 
and more broadly Aristotelian moral psychology focus on the natural species of action. 
This is problematic because, at best, it is ambiguous whether such behaviors are morally 
relevant-- it may be the case that the same behavior allows for more than one moral 
description.28 At worst, the behavior does not admit of any moral description because it 
 
28 The problem here runs parallel to a problem pointed out by early critics of situationism aiming 
to defend the existence of virtues. In Gopal Sreenivasan, "Character and Consistency: Still More Errors," 
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is not the product of the will, does not involve the kind of cognition that makes it free 
and thus something that moves us closer or further from our final end as humans. 
Happily, this focus on behavior systematically divorced from goals and intentions 
is not a feature of all areas of contemporary psychology. Within psychological research 
on aggression, for example, there is significant work seeking to identify (inter alia) 
associations between cognitive processes and behaviors that fall under moral 
descriptions-- behaviors that are defined by what is intended or by a goal the person 
has in mind. 
In what follows, we will focus on the psychological study of aggression. This area 
of research highlights as the relevant behavior the very kinds of actions that on the 
Thomistic view count as morally evaluable-- intentional actions. Aggression is defined as 
the intentional use of force or power to threaten to cause or to cause harm to another. 
29 Consider two cases where the behavior admits of the same natural description:  
Keepaway: Aya, Hassan, and Laith are playing keepaway with a ball and Laith is in 
the middle. Aya aims the ball at Hassan but Laith moves between them and the ball hits 
him in the face.  
 
Mind 117 (2008): 603-612, Sreenivasan argues that the psychological studies situationists use to back their 
claims are not even about the right sorts of traits because they look at the wrong sort of consistency.  





Hit: Daniel and Jose are playing keepaway with Lena’s backpack. Daniel gets 
frustrated with Lana and throws the backpack at her face, hitting her instead of tossing it 
to Jose.  
In research on aggression, the former does not qualify as an instance of 
aggressive behavior but the latter does. The researchers include Daniel’s and Aya’s goals 
in the description of the behavior they wish to study; in Keepaway, Aya’s goal is getting 
the ball to Hassan by throwing it past Laith (the intention), whereas in Hit, Daniel’s goal 
is intimidating Lena by hitting her with the backpack. 
Thomistic moral psychology provides different moral descriptions of the actions 
in Keepaway and Hit respectively, though they have the same natural description. What 
is interesting and distinctive about this area of developmental psychology from a 
philosophical perspective is that it explicitly studies behaviors under their moral 
descriptions, rather than just natural descriptions.  
Aggression is typically defined in the empirical literature as behavior that is 
intended to cause harm or discomfort, or the intentional use of force or power that 
causes or has the potential to cause harm.30 It is an umbrella category that ranges from 
behavior that causes minimal or temporary harm (e.g., pushing someone) to severe 
 
30 Jaana Juvonen and Sandra Graham, "Preface," in Peer Harassment in School: The Plight of the 
Vulnerable and Victimized (New York: The Guilford Press, 2001), xiii-xvi. Alan E. Kazdin, "Conceptualizing 




violence (e.g., killing someone). Related to youth aggression, peer-targeted aggression 
is typically categorized as physical (also called direct or overt when combined with 
verbal aggression), verbal, relational (also called social or indirect), cyber (also called 
electronic or Internet), or dating. 31 However, all aggression is united in the empirical 
literature in that it is operationally defined, broadly, as intentional behaviors with the 
end of causing harm. Measures of aggression include items that either assess intention 
or items assessing behaviors that have fairly obvious malintent. For example, it is fairly 
obvious that threatening someone with a weapon, an item included on a range of youth 
self-reported measures of aggression, has the intention of causing harm.32 Similarly, 
calling someone “mean” names clearly indicates the intent of meanness. (This is 
measured on the verbal aggression subscale by whether the participant yelled at 
someone or called them mean names.) 
Aggression researchers recognize that in contrast, some behaviors have an 
unclear end. Specifically, simply identifying the behavior without intent can lead to a 
 
31 Noel A Card, Brian D. Stucky, Gita M. Sawalani, and Todd D. Little, " Direct and Indirect 
Aggression During Childhood and Adolescence: A Meta‐Analytic Review of Gender Differences, 
Intercorrelations, and Relations to Maladjustment," Child Development 79 (2008): 1185-1229.  Elizabeth A. 
Goncy, Kevin S. Sutherland, Albert D. Farrell, Terri N. Sullivan, and Sarah T. Doyle, "Measuring teacher 
implementation in delivery of a bullying prevention program: The impact of instructional and procedural 
adherence and competence on student responsiveness," Prevention science 16 (2015): 440-450. Krista 
Mehari and Albert D. Farrell, "Where does Cyberbullying Fit? A Comparison of Competing Models of 
Adolescent Aggression," Psychology of Violence 8 (2016): 31-42, https://doi.org/10.1037/vio0000081. 
32 Albert D. Farrell, Elizabeth A. Goncy, Terri N. Sullivan, and Erin L. Thompson. "Evaluation of the 
Problem Behavior Frequency Scale–Teacher Report Form for assessing behavior in a sample of urban 
adolescents," Psychological assessment 30 (2018): 1277. 
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lack of distinction between playful teasing vs. verbal or cyber aggression, roughhousing 
vs. physical aggression, carelessness or self-absorption vs. relational aggression, and 
even flirting vs. dating aggression. For example, a teen might throw an object at another 
teen to flirt or play with them, or they might throw an object at someone out of anger 
or to hurt that person. In those cases, measure developers try to specify in the item that 
the end, intent, or goal is to cause harm. Using the Problem Behavior Frequency Scales 
(PBFS) as an example, an item on the physical aggression subscale clarifies this, “thrown 
something at someone to hurt them.”33 Similarly, relational aggression can include 
deliberately excluding someone from a group in order to cause harm. However, friend 
groups form naturally based on interest and similarities, so the absence of a person in a 
friend group does not imply aggression. Thus, one relational aggression item on the 
PBFS specifies, “Not let someone be in your group anymore because you were mad at 
them.”34 Along the same lines, teasing could be playful and friendly, or it could be 
intended to cause harm. To address this, a verbal aggression item indicates, “Teased 
someone to make them angry.”35 
Now contrast this way of defining aggressive behaviors with the methods 
employed in psychological studies used to cast doubt on philosophical claims about 
 






moral behavior and character. These studies investigate associations between behaviors 
at the level of natural descriptions and cognition. In Batson’s moral hypocrisy studies, 
the behavior in question was assigning the positive consequences task to oneself or to 
another, or using a coin flip to assign.36 These are natural descriptions of behaviors. 
Batson attempts to read into these behaviors intentions such as being moral or 
appearing moral using other measures. In fact, it is assumed that assigning positive 
consequences tasks to others is moral. But what is being studied primarily is not the 
behaviors only under such intentional descriptions-- participants doing what they 
considered morally suboptimal, or doing what they take to be most beneficial to 
themselves at cost to another participant. Rather they issue conclusions about 
correlations between “moral behavior” described naturally, as either flipping the coin 
and following its assignment or assigning the other participant the positive 
consequences task.  
Let’s imagine a possible moral description on the Thomistic view consistent with 
observed participant behavior under natural descriptions. Suppose Emma is 
participating in the study because she owes her roommate for a utility bill and needs 
some extra money. Combining the money she will earn for participating and the $30 gift 
card she can pay her roommate back in full. So Emma chooses to assign herself the 
 
36 Daniel C. Batson, Diane Kobrynowicz, Jessica L. Dinnerstein, Hannah C. Kampf, and Angela D. 




positive consequences task instead of the anonymous other participant in order to get 
the gift card and pay her roommate for the utility bill. Perhaps Emma also self-reported 
having a justice perspective about social conflict situations. In this case, does Emma 
perform an “immoral action” from the Thomistic perspective? We think not. Given what 
she is attending to in the situation, namely the debt owed to her roommate, and what 
Emma is not attending to, namely, possible need of the anonymous participant, it does 
not seem she is acting against any moral principle. Perhaps in the abstract, Emma even 
agrees that it is best to flip a coin, but here and now she thinks her debt to her 
roommate makes it more important to get the money than the other participant, who 
doesn’t expect to get the gift card anyway.  
The moral hypocrisy studies don’t threaten the claims regarding behavior that are 
central to Thomistic moral psychology. The studies did not ask participants what their 
goals were in assigning the tasks. The researchers inferred participant motivation from 
their prior self reports about how “moral” they thought various choices would be, but of 
course, we have no idea how the participants were thinking about moral rightness and 
wrongness. Would they consider Ari’s assigning to the positive consequences task to 
herself morally right, for instance, or morally wrong even though done for the sake of 
doing something else morally right like paying her roommate? Or, suppose the 
participant thought assigning the positive consequences task to someone else was most 
morally right, but that assigning it to themselves was morally okay. Again, here, it would 
 
 34 
be quite difficult to infer from their prior self report whether the participant had a moral 
goal in mind and whether their choice was a product of that goal. In sum, the data of 
the moral hypocrisy studies does not ultimately bear on either the End Apprehension 
Claim or the Intention Claim, even though the researchers claimed to show that people’s 
moral reasoning comes apart from their behavior. The kind of behavior that comes apart 
from moral reasoning, according to these studies, is not the kind of behavior (or 
behavior under the sort of description) at issue in these claims of Thomistic moral 
psychology. 
By contrast, developmental psychological studies that investigate associations 
between aggression and cognitive capacities and processes do bear on such claims of 
Thomistic moral psychology. For aggression so described does fall under the purview of 
human action-- the sort of behavior that certain cognitive activities and capacities are 
supposed to cause, and thus we should expect at the very least correlation between 
them.  
VI. Cognitive Processes in Aquinas and Social Information Processing Theory 
So far, we have argued that developmental psychological work on aggression 
focuses on behaviors under the sort of descriptions that are relevant to central claims of 
Thomistic moral psychology. We also argued that the psychological work most often 
cited in literature on neo-Aristotelian moral psychology and ethics focuses on behavior 
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under the wrong sort of description. Where does this put us with respect to the Minimal 
Empirical Adequacy Challenge?  
Recall that according to the Challenge, empirical work can give us evidence 
regarding moral psychology by demonstrating the presence or absence of correlations 
where moral psychology posits causation. For instance, the Thomistic End Apprehension 
Claim says that certain behaviors-- human actions—are partly caused by the agent 
identifying some end or goal in such action. For psychological studies to cast doubt on 
such a claim, they must show either absence of or negative correlation between the 
cognitive process of end apprehension and the behavior that qualifies as human action.  
In general, for empirical work to be germane to the empirical adequacy of moral 
psychological claims, it must meet three conditions. The work must (1) study precisely 
the sort of behaviors in question on the moral psychological account, (2) study the sort 
of cognitive processes and capacities posited by the moral psychological account, and 
(3) identify either a correlation or absence of correlation between these cognitive 
processes and the behaviors a moral psychological account claims the processes 
generate.  
Our argument thus far shows that the studies ubiquitous in the philosophical 
literature on virtue do not meet the first condition for Thomistic moral psychology and 
consequently cannot alone provide evidence for or against claims of that moral 
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psychology. We have also argued that aggression research at least meets this first 
condition. 
For aggression research to provide full-blooded evidence for or against Thomistic 
moral psychology, however, it must also meet the second and third conditions. Our aim 
in this section is to show that it does.  
We will argue that social information processing (SIP) theory used by aggression 
researchers models cognitive processes and patterns related to attention in decision-
making similar to those Thomistic moral psychology posits. Empirical correlations 
between these cognitive processes and behaviors like aggression, then, are precisely the 
sorts of correlations (or lack thereof) that could provide evidence for (or against) the 
Human Differentia, End-Apprehension, and Intention claims, inter alia.  
Let’s first examine social information processing models on their own terms. SIP 
models identify and label the process through which adolescents make the decision to 
aggress.  One prominent SIP model is the one created by Crick and Dodge.37 The 
occurrence of aggression is explained as the outcome of a continuous social exchange 
between adolescents and their environments.  They identified six cognitive steps in the 
decision to aggress.  In each stage, adolescents integrate environmental and internal 
stimuli with cognition from “databases”—memory, acquired rules, and social schemas 
 
37 Nicki R. Crick and Kenneth A. Dodge, “A review and reformulation of social information-




and knowledge.38 In the SIP model, the person is an active agent who processes 
information with their existing knowledge, beliefs, and values to make decisions about 
behavioral choices.  
Adolescents first encode cues, both in the environment (such as people laughing) 
and internally (e.g., physiological arousal such as rapid heartbeat).  Then adolescents 
interpret those cues, making intent attributions and evaluating past performance and 
what the interaction means for them and the other person or people.  Adolescents 
clarify their goals, generate possible responses, evaluate and select a response, and 
enact that response.39 Goals clarification and response evaluation are particularly 
relevant to Thomistic moral psychology. Goals are typically measured by self-report of 
general or situation-specific social goals. Response evaluation includes multiple factors 
and processes (e.g., such as self-efficacy to engage in the response; perception of the 
likely outcomes of the response), but most relevant to Thomistic moral psychology, it 
includes normative beliefs about aggressive behaviors. There is a large body of research 
supporting the relation between social goals and aggressive behavior as well as 






Many leading researchers identified aggression as a technique adolescents used 
to achieve social goals.40  The relation of aggression to social goals has been examined 
across a range of research. Social goals have been broadly classified as prosocial (goals 
related to developing or maintaining relationships, helping others, or promoting 
fairness) or antisocial (goals that benefit oneself by harming, taking resources away 
from, or diminishing others). Aggression can be used as a tool to promote antisocial 
goals, such as by establishing dominance and status within a group and creating 
boundaries between people within and outside a group.  For example, intra-group 
aggression decreases after hierarchies are established within a group.41  In addition, 
adolescents may use aggression to maintain order by punishing those who do not 
conform to group norms.42 Antagonistic interactions directed at people outside the 
group, such as sarcasm and ridicule, draws attention to people who are different and 
inferior, which promote a sense of identity by indicating whom one is not.43  
This conception of social goals suggests an entry point for thinking of the 
connection to Thomistic moral psychology. Social goals so conceived are plausibly 
 
40 Albert Bandura, Claudio Barbaranelli, Gian V. Caprara, and Concetta Pastorelli "Mechanisms of 
Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 
(1996); 364-374. Terrie E. Moffit, " Adolescent-limited and life-course persistent antisocial behavior: A 
developmental taxonomy," Psychological Review 100 (1993): 674-701. 
41 Leslie A. Gavin and Wyndol Furman, "Age Differences in Adolescents' Perceptions of Their Peer 
Groups," Developmental Psychology 25 (1989): 827-834. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Jeffrey Arnett, Adolescence and Emerging Adulthood: A Cultural Approach, 4th Edition (Boston: 
Prentice Hall, 2010). 
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instances of what Thomistic moral psychology describes as ends in human action. Recall 
that for Aquinas, the end of an action is what gives it its species (and “form,” he says). It 
is just in virtue of the fact that we can formulate ends cognitively that we can act freely, 
from rational appetite instead of mere appetite -- this is the Human Differentia claim. 
Aquinas argues that when we perceive features of a situation, two things can happen. 
Just like nonhuman animals, we size up these features and apprehend them under 
particular descriptions, like “this lamb” and the description “alive.”44 Nonhuman animals 
can even encode certain action goals in the way they perceive a situation; a wolf might 
see “this lamb” as “edible” or “to be eaten,” and the lamb might see “this wolf” as “to be 
fled” or “to be feared.”  Unlike nonhuman animals, though, Aquinas thinks humans have 
the capacity to make a rational judgment about these perceptions; such a rational 
judgment consists in reason evaluating some apprehended action goal as “suitable” or 
“unsuitable,” “good” or “evil,” “beneficial” or “detrimental.”45 The person’s goals on this 
level specify what human act she is performing—that is, the moral species of her action.  
What we see in aggression research is a use of an agent’s social goal to specify 
the kind of behavior at play. For instance, aggression researchers will categorize Aya’s 
action in Keepaway as not an instance of aggression because of the presence of her 
 
44 Daniel De Haan, “Moral Perception and the Function of the Vis Cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas’s 
Doctrine of Antecedent and Consequent Passions,” Documenti e Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica 
Medievale 25 (2014): 289-330, at 313. 
45 Ibid., 314. 
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prosocial goals of playing a game and promoting friendship with Laith and absence of 
antisocial goals like harming him. In Hit, aggression researchers and Thomistic moral 
psychologists alike will characterize Daniel’s behavior as aggression precisely because of 
the presence of the end, or social goal, of harming Lana. In other words, the cognitive 
element Thomistic moral psychology uses to specify a human action is functionally the 
same element SIP theory and aggression research uses to specify aggressive behaviors.  
This functional equivalence of social goals and ends does not by itself support 
the Human Differentia claim but it is significant. It illustrates one way in which 
aggression research assumes as does the Thomist, that aggressive behaviors differ from 
accidental behaviors due to the presence of a special cognitive process (one that is 
absent in the accidental case) and that this cognitive process is a kind of goal-
orientation embedded in the choice of action unique to humans.  
Even more suggestive is the way aggression researchers measure social goals. If 
the instruments by which aggression researchers measure social goals are getting at the 
thing conceptualized by the SIP model, then quite plausibly this provides positive 
evidence that an element of rational appetite, namely apprehension of ends qua ends, 
does occur. Findings on prosocial and antisocial goals may lend serious support to the 
End Apprehension claim.  
The harmony between Thomistic moral psychology’s claims about cognition and 
SIP theory goes deeper. SIP theory holds that a person brings to deliberation a 
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database: dispositions, beliefs, and schemas that inflect but do not determine how she 
views her situation and response options. So too, on Thomistic moral psychology. 
Aquinas claims that our patterns of attention and dispositions can structure how objects 
appear to us through the imagination, but these do not singularly determine what we 
do.46 Aquinas says, “Humans, just as much as brute animals, are induced [to act] through 
favors and deterrents [lit. whips], or commands and prohibitions—but in diverse ways.  
For it is in the power of humans to choose or flee, by the judgment of reason, the very 
same things similarly represented, whether they are commanded and prohibited, or 
beneficial or deterring.  But in brutes there is a natural judgment determined so that 
what is proposed or occurs in one way, will be received or avoided in the same way,” (De 
Veritate 24.2 ad 7). In other words, for Aquinas, what he calls “imagination” is a pattern-
sensitive cognitive ability that presents objects in the environment to the agent as, for 
instance, threatening or appealing. The difference between human adults, at least, and 
nonhuman animals is that we can see someone as a potential threat without action on 
that information immediately following, since we can wait on reason to endorse the 
apprehension or bring to mind alternative ways of apprehending the other person. In 
other words, imagination-- how we categorize objects in the environment -- influences, 
 
46 Therese Scarpelli Cory, "Aquinas and Freud: Imagination’s Role in Unconscious Motivation,” 




but does not determine, what happens next, just as with schemas and dispositions on 
SIP theory. 
In both theories, what comes next is active agency. Once environmental 
information has been encoded cognitively, the agent does the work of interpreting that 
information. Thomistic moral psychology countenances a cognitive process of “the 
understanding” whereby the agent focuses her attention. Some scholars explain this 
activity as consciously construing the situation.47 Suppose that Lena is hit by Daniel’s 
backpack, for instance, and encodes Daniel’s behavior as a physical harm. She can then 
actively focus her attention on the harm and perception of Daniel as a threat or on the 
appearance that the harm was an accident and discount the perception of Daniel as a 
threat. Here she is interpreting the situation, according to SIP theory, and engaging her 
rational capacity on Thomistic moral psychology. As she then generates response 
options, she weighs them; Aquinas very clearly carves out this kind of cognitive activity 
in his discussion of intentional actions, when one elects a means to achieve an end, 
which we can think of as functionally equivalent to response options in light of a goal. 
Aquinas claims that this settling on something as a means to an end is the activity of the 
will-- appetite moving the agent to an action on the basis of something presented to it 
by reason. Thus it seems to us that the steps outlined as precursors to behavior on the 
SIP model are cognitive processes Thomistic moral psychology is particularly interested 
 
47 Therese Scarpelli Cory, "Aquinas and Freud,” 8. 
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in. For they are the precise processes that involve the interplay of appetite and reason 
that make an action the product of rational appetite-- the will.  
VII. Correlation Data and Claims of Thomistic Moral Psychology 
At this point, we have argued that aggression research focuses on both the sort 
of behavior that qualifies as human action and the sort of cognitive processes Thomistic 
moral psychology takes to be relevant to the production of human action. We are now 
in a position to consider the Minimal Empirical Adequacy of Thomistic moral 
psychology. Does aggression research show there are correlations where Thomistic 
moral psychology says there is causation? Does it show there is not the kind of 
correlation that the causal story of Thomistic moral psychology would predict?   
 A body of research has consistently supported a relation between social 
goals and perpetration of aggression. In a meta-analytic review of this work, Samson 
and colleagues identified that prosocial goals were associated with lower rates of 
aggressive behavior, and antisocial goals were associated with higher rates of aggressive 
behavior in youth.48 For example, one longitudinal study found that youth who 
prioritized revenge goals were more likely to engage in aggression in the future than 
youth who did not.49 Similarly, in a study of ethnically diverse adolescents transitioning 
 
48 Jennifer E. Samson, Tiina Ojanen, Alexandra Hollo, "Social Goals and Youth Aggression: Meta‐
Analysis of Prosocial and Antisocial Goals," Social Development 21 (2012): 645-666.  
49 Kristina L McDonald, John E Lochman, "Predictors and Outcomes Associated with Trajectories of 
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to middle school, social dominance goals were predictive of aggression across gender 
and ethnicity.50  
Further, normative beliefs about aggression and antisocial behavior are related to 
physical, verbal, and relational aggression.51 Normative beliefs represent injunctive 
norms, or individuals’ perceptions of what is acceptable or appropriate behavior.52 Of 
particular relevance, normative beliefs may vary based on the situation, which makes 
adolescents’ decisions about choosing to aggress very nuanced. For example, 
adolescents may believe that it is unacceptable to fight in general, but that it is an 
appropriate response if others insult their family, or if they believe others will continue 
to harass them unless they fight.53 (e.g., Farrell et al., 2015). To further explore this, 
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Adolescence 34 (2005): 229-243.   
52 See, for instance, Rowell L. Huesmann & Nancy G. Guerra, “Children's normative beliefs about 
aggression and aggressive behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(1997): 408–
419. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.2.408 
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Farrell and colleagues developed and validated a measure of normative beliefs about 
aggression that assessed not only global beliefs about aggression but also beliefs about 
instrumental aggression, reactive aggression, and the idea that fighting is sometimes 
necessary. They found support for four distinct sets of beliefs: beliefs against aggression 
(e.g., “Fighting...is a bad thing to do”); beliefs supporting instrumental aggression 
(unprovoked aggression perpetration with the goal of self-gain; e.g., “it’s okay to fight 
someone if they have something you want”); beliefs supporting reactive aggression 
(aggression in response to provocation or anger; e.g., “It’s okay to push someone if 
you’re mad”); and beliefs that fighting is sometimes necessary (at times, the best 
available option is to fight; e.g., “If you don’t fight some kids, they’ll just keep picking on 
you”).54 Each set of beliefs showed a different pattern of correlations with self-reported 
and teacher-reported aggression. For example, the belief that fighting is sometimes 
necessary was unrelated to teacher ratings of aggression, suggesting that believing that 
fighting is sometimes necessary may not predict adolescents’ actual use of aggression. 
In contrast, adolescents who had normative beliefs supporting proactive aggression had 
higher teacher reports of aggressive behavior. These findings suggest first that 
adolescent goals, or the ends they have in mind, might vary while observed behavior 





actually may predict performance of those action types, especially when the type of 
action coded for is intentional.  
There is evidence that moral reasoning is also closely tied to aggression, as 
suggested by both SIP model and theory of cognitive development.  Interestingly, when 
discussing aggressive behavior, aggressive adolescents pointed to rules and 
consequences as reasons to avoid engaging in those behaviors, whereas nonaggressive 
adolescents pointed to the wrongness of the act itself.  This may indicate that aggressive 
adolescents consider aggression to violate societal rules but not necessarily moral 
standards, increasing their likelihood of aggressing if they believe they can avoid 
negative outcomes.55  
 This brief overview of a large literature in developmental psychology 
suggests that research on aggression has much to offer Thomistic moral psychology in 
terms of a direction to look for empirical testing. Programmatically, doing this well 
would require carefully analyzing individual measures-- measures of social goals, 
measures of the cognitions involved in the six steps of social information processing, 
and measures of behaviors. We take ourselves to have offered an example of how this 
might be done in our discussion of normative beliefs about aggression measure. And to 
the extent psychological work in other areas is focused on behaviors under their moral 
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descriptions, and cognitive processes like the ones countenanced by Thomistic moral 
psychology as causally efficacious, similar work could be fruitful.  
VIII. Conclusion 
In this essay we have attempted to do three things. The first is to argue that there 
is an empirical challenge that Thomistic moral psychology faces that goes beyond the 
standard situationist challenge. Because Thomistic moral psychology makes claims 
about human action and cognition independently of its claims about virtues and vices, it 
should not conflict with research on correlation where it claims causation. We called this 
the Minimal Empirical Adequacy Challenge.  
 Second, we argued that many of the most famous psychological studies 
discussed in moral philosophy do not bear on Thomistic moral psychological claims. 
This is because they do not investigate behavior under the right sort of description to 
do so. Insofar as these studies code behavior on natural description instead of moral, or 
intentional, descriptions, they do not offer us data about correlations between human 
actions and cognition, but rather acts of humans and cognition. But Thomistic moral 
psychology is not interested in acts of humans broadly speaking-- it is interested in 
human actions.  
 Third, we suggested that aggression research does focus on both the 
behavioral and the cognitive elements about which Thomistic moral psychology makes 
claims. Thus it can offer us some empirical evidence that bears on Thomistic moral 
 
 48 
psychology insofar as it tells us there are or are not correlations between cognitions and 
the behaviors Thomistic moral psychology says those cognitions cause. Thus, aggression 
research is relevant to figuring out whether Thomistic moral psychology meets the 
Minimal Empirical Adequacy Challenge, and suggestive in providing some evidence that 
it does for a domain of social action. 
